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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
yiCTORIA L. BUYERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16160 
D&"lNY G. BUYERS I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAI~TIFF-RESPONDENT 
Appeal from an Order of the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, H. Haurice 
Harding, Judge presiding. 
Stephen R. McCaughey 
Attorney for Respondent 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger F. Cutler 
Attorney for Appellant 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTORIA L. BUYERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16160 
DANNY G. BUYERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent, Victoria L. Buyers, accepts the 
defendant-appellant's Statement of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The Court determined the date on which the appellants 
obligation to pay $100.00 per month as child support matured. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
courts decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff-respondent accepts paragraph 1 and 2 
of defendant-appellant's statement of facts except that part 
wherein it is stated that Mr. Buyers was unrepresented by 
counsel because of a lack of funds. There was no evidence of 
a lack of funds. 
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2. Plaintiff-respondent accepts paragraph 3 and 4 
of the statement of facts. 
3. The decree provided in paragraph 3 that the 
defendant-appellant would pay $86.36 on the balance due on 
the Toyota automobile until payment for the car was completed. 
It was estimated that it would be three and one-half years 
(3 1/2) before the automobile would be paid off. The Decree 
provided that as soon as that event occured the child support 
obligation would be $100.00, ~6.36 less than the defendant has 
been paying. 
In paragraph 6 the defendant-appellant was ordered in 
addition to the obligation of paying off the Toyota automobile, 
which the evidence showed was financed by the Salt Lake Ci t.y 
Fireman's Credit Union, to pay "those obligations to the Salt 
Lake Fireman's Credit Union." 
The evidence adduced at the hearing from Clinten Barker, 
manager of the Salt Lake City Fireman's Creidt Union (R-3,4) 
showed that on March 17, 1975 the defendant-appellant borrowed 
$2,587.65 from the credit union, said amount being added to a 
previous balance of $1,509.81. Barker further testified that 
the $2,587.65 borrowed to finance the purchase of the 1975 
Toyota automobile, (-4) Barker testified that, using the 
figure of $86.36, on a monthly basis since the loan for the 
Toyota automobile was incurred, that on June 17, 1976 the 
balance on the Toyota automobile was $1,620.67. Mr. Barker 
then testified that using the same $86.36 amount, and through 
the use of an arnrnortization table that Toyota automobile loan 
would have been paid off on March 17, 1978. 
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Mr. Barker testified that on April 9, 1976, when the 
decree was granted, that the defendant-appellant was paying 
$185.00 per month on the Fireman's Credit Union obligation. 
(R-8) 
Mr. Barker also testified that since the obligation for 
the car had been incurred, the defendant-appellant had borrowed 
several other sums, the largest being $1,624.08, to the balance. 
It should be noted that all of the sums so added by the defendant-
appellant were done so after October 2, 1975, the date set where 
he was no longer responsible for plaintiff-respondents debts. 
(R8,9) 
ARGUMENT 
Addressing first defendant-appellants Point II that there 
was no l'lc>.terial change of circumstances shown for a modification 
of the decree. (1) as the amended order reflects, plaintiff-
responaent at the hearing abandoned her effort in seeking an 
increase in child support, but instead asked the Court only to 
determine when the Toyota automobile was paid off and to give 
her a judgement for any back support. As the record shows 
defendant-appellant made no objection to this procedure. (2) 
there was no modification of the decree, only a determination 
of when the defendant-appellant should have began to pay $100.00 
per month as support. 
The Court at R-9 correctly framed the issue before it: 
The Court. "We want to find out how much 
was owing on the Toyota on the 9th of 
April, 1976. That is all we want to know." 
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The amount borrowed on March 17, 1975 for purchase of 
the Toyota automobile was $2,587.65. That sum was added to 
a balance of $1,509.81. The decree provided that as of 
April 19, 1976 the defendant-appellant was responsible for 
all obligations owing the credit union (Fireman's). The 
amount defendant-appellant and plaintiff-respondent paid on 
the total balance between March 17, 1975 and July 1976 must 
be pro-rated between the two sums. Using the $86.36 figure 
established by the Court as payment on the automobile balance, 
defendant-appellant was credited that amount each month from 
March 17, 1975 until April 9, 1976 on the Toyota automobile 
balance. The testimony indicated that as of April 9, 1975 
defendant-appellant was paying $185.00 per month as the total 
balance. Had the $185.00 per month been applied in proportion 
to the two amounts, (i.e. the original balance and the automobile 
loan) it is obvious that much more than $86.36 would have been 
applied to the Toyota automobile loan. 
Defendant-appellant's theory is that the original amount 
borrowed would have to be paid off in full prior to any money 
being applied to the Toyota automobile balance. Since defendant-
appellant was made responsible for the entire debt, the Court 
decided upon a sum that approximated 36 equal payments from Maret 
17, 1975 until March 17, 1978. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgement of the District Court should be affirmed and 
the plaintiff-respondent should be awarded costs and a sum of 
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$350.00 as attorneys fees on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Stephen R. McCaughey, Attorney 
for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Roger Cutler, Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant, at 602 East Third South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 on this~ day of February, 1979. 
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